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ABSTRACT  Recently, attempts have been made to formalize the assumptions of the 
‘slippery slope’ framework about the effects of trust (in) and power (of) tax authorities on tax 
compliance. In this sense, the proposed theoretical work introduces the basic insights of the 
‘slippery slope’ framework into the benchmark macroeconomic model of the labour market 
with tax evasion. The key result of this integration is the following: with the right mix of policy 
tools of deterrence and trust in tax authorities, a reduction in tax evasion may increase labour 
market tightness and decrease unemployment.
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The ‘slippery slope’ framework (Kirchler, 2007; Kirchler et al., 2008a) was developed to 
address the puzzling findings in tax compliance decisions.
1  Indeed, traditional economic 
models of income tax evasion à la Allingham and Sandmo’s (1972) (for a review see Sandmo, 
2005), based above all on monitoring probability and expected penalty, predict far too little 
compliance and far too much tax evasion (Feld and Frey, 2002). Furthermore, the empirical 
support for the deterrent effect of audits and fines is weak and unstable (Kirchler et al., 2008b). 
Hence, besides the well-studied instruments of deterrence, the interaction of power (of) and 
trust (in) tax authorities is necessary to foster and stabilize the voluntary cooperation of honest 
taxpayers (Kirchler, 2007; Kirchler et al., 2008a; Muehlbacher and Kirchler, 2010).
The ‘slippery slope’ framework distinguishes two forms of tax compliance: voluntary 
and enforced compliance. Voluntary compliance depends on trust in tax authorities, whereas 
enforced compliance depends on the power of tax authorities to clamp down on tax evaders. 
Hence, trust (in) and power (of) tax authorities are the major determinants for each form of 
compliance. Furthermore, the ‘slippery slope’ framework stresses the crucial interaction of 
power and trust (Kirchler  et al., 2008a; Muehlbacher and Kirchler, 2010). In short, this 
framework assumes that power has influence on trust and vice versa. More precisely, trust 
increases and power decreases voluntary compliance, whereas power increases and trust 
decreases enforced compliance.
Recently attempts have been made to formalize the assumptions from the ‘slippery 
slope’ framework about the effects of trust (in)  and power (of) tax authorities on tax 
compliance (Prinz et al., 2010). This paper develops an equilibrium model of the labour market 
with income tax evasion in order to study the relation between tax compliance (both voluntary 
and enforced) and unemployment. In particular, we find that with the right mix of policy tools 
of deterrence and trust in tax authorities, a reduction in tax evasion may increase labour 
market tightness and decrease unemployment.
The effect of trust and power on tax compliance can be shown by simple scatter 
diagrams concerning 29 European countries, in which shadow economy is used as proxy for 
tax evasion, government effectiveness as proxy for trust in tax authorities, and rule of law as 
1 Another important strand of tax compliance literature concentrates on tax morale. The concept of tax morale was 
introduced in the tax compliance literature to explain both the high degree of tax compliance in many countries 
where the level of deterrence is too low (Torgler, 2007; Slemrod, 2007) and the huge differences in tax compliance 
between countries or regions despite the same tax and punishment policies, the so-called “Palermo-Milano puzzle” 
(Rothstein, 2000).
2proxy for power of tax authorities (see Figs. 1-2). The correlation in both cases is strong and 
negative.
==========  Figs. 1-2 about here (now at the end with related data)  =========
The  rest  of  the  paper is  organised  as follows:  section  2 presents  the  matching 
framework with company income tax evasion; section 3 extends the model to the interaction of 
voluntary and enforced tax compliance; while section 4 concludes.
2. Model with tax evasion and unemployment
We consider a basic matching framework à la Pissarides (2000) with a continuum of 
homogeneous workers of measure one. The creation of employment occurs in a labour market 
characterized by trading frictions due to costly and time-consuming matching of workers and 
firms. As usual (see Pissarides, 2000; Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001), an aggregate matching 
function is used to summarize these frictions. Precisely, the number of job matches formed per 
unit of time is   ( ) v u, m m = , where  u is the number of unemployed workers and  v is the 
number of vacancies. The matching function is strictly increasing but concave  in both 
arguments and displays constant returns to scale. It follows that the labour market tightness is 
given by   v/u θ = . Hence,   ( ) { } { }
1 θ 1, m /v u   v, m θ q
- = º   and   ( ) { } { } θ,1 m /u u   v, m θ g = º   are the 
probability   of   filling   a   vacancy   and   of   finding   a   job,   respectively.
2  To   ensure   that 
unemployment exists in steady state, it is assumed that job destruction occurs at the exogenous 
rate δ. Therefore, in steady state the matching and job destruction rates allow us to obtain the 
steady state unemployment rate:
( ) ( ) u θ g u 1 δ u × - - × =  ( ) ( ) θ g δ δ/ u + = Þ         (1)
which depends positively on the separation rate δ, and negatively on labour market tightness 
θ . The Bellman equations specified to find infinite horizon steady-state solutions are:
value of a vacancy ( ) ( ) V J θ q c rV - × + - =
value of a filled job ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) J V δ e c w e mc e φ ρ w y τ y rJ
D - × + - - + × - - × - =
value of searching for a job ( ) ( ) U W θ g b rU - × + =
value of being employed ( ) W U δ w rW - × + =
2 Standard technical assumptions are assumed, i.e. lim q → 0 q(q) = lim q → ∞ g(q) = ∞, and lim 
q → 0 g(q) = lim q → ∞ q(q) = 
0.
3where r is the exogenous discounted rate; c is the vacant job cost; y is the true productivity, 
while yD is the declared one; τ  is the company (corporate) income tax; 
3 
D y - y e º  is the evaded 
income; w is the wage rate (tax-deductible);
4 b is the benefit of being unemployed;  ρ is the rate 
whereby tax authorities detect tax evasion and levy the penalty  φ, with  τ φ > ;  ( ) e c  is the 
concealment cost, with   ( ) 0 > e c' ; and  ( ) e mc , with   ( ) 0 > e mc' , is the reputation cost which 
captures the non-pecuniary cost associated with tax evasion.
5 Intuitively, the higher the evaded 
income, the greater the penalty, concealment cost and reputation cost.
The optimum amount of income tax evasion is obtained by the value of  yD  which 
maximizes the present value of a filled job, i.e.:
( ) ( ) ( ) e c' e m' φ ρ τ + + =                      (2)
unsurprisingly, at the optimum, the marginal tax saving has to equal the sum of the expected 
risk of tax evasion and the marginal concealment cost. It follows that there is no tax evasion if 
the expected risk is greater than or equal to the tax rate, i.e. if  ( ) ( ) e m' φ ρ τ + £ , whereas, on the 
other hand, with  ( ) ( ) e m' φ ρ τ + >
 it is always optimal for firms to under-report income. We 
will concentrate on the non-trivial case where there is tax evasion ( y y
D < ), but it is not 
optimal for the firm to evade all of the income ( 0 y
D > ). This implies that  ( ) ( ) e m' φ ρ τ + >
 and 
the concealment cost is convex. These assumptions enable us to obtain an interior solution with 
positive evaded income.
6
As usual (see Pissarides, 2000), the equilibrium value of labour market tightness is 
given by the free-entry condition or zero profit condition (i.e. V = 0): 









- - + × - × -
=
-
                                  (3)
3 We consider only the company income tax evasion. Kolm and Nielsen (2008) develop a matching model in which 
firm and worker agree together on the amount of labour income to report to the tax authorities.
4 In fact, if the remuneration of labour is paid out as official wage, then this part can be deducted from the firm’s 
revenue in computing its taxable income.
5 As in Kim (2003), the reputation cost depends on whether evasion is detected or not.
6 Note that the optimal level of y
D is independent of labour market tightness.
4Hence, an increase in tax evasion (i.e. a reduction in 







, if   ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 > + + + e c' e m' φ ρ τ - , otherwise it increases  θ . Intuitively, if the overall 
costs of tax evasion are higher than taxes, then to under-report income is not profitable for 
firms.
Finally, wage is the outcome of a bilateral matching problem described by the Nash 
bargaining solution,
( ) ( ) { } ( ) ( ) ( ) V J
β 1
β
U W V J U W argmax w
β 1 β - ×
-
= - Þ - × - =
-
                     (4)
where  ( ) 1   0, β Î  is the bargaining  power of workers. Therefore, equations (1) – (4) together 
define a steady state equilibrium with income tax evasion.
3. Extension to the interaction of voluntary and enforced compliance
The ‘slippery slope’ framework emphasizes the importance of trust and a fair interaction 
between tax authorities and their clients, so as to shift from “a cops-and-robbers climate towards a 
service–client relationship” (Muehlbacher and Kirchler, 2010).
In this extension of the basic matching framework developed in the second section, we 
try to capture  the   importance  of  the  interaction  of  power and  trust  for  “overall”  tax 
compliance. Recall that in the basic model ‘voluntary tax compliance’ is caught by the income 
declared by firms,  
D y ; whereas ‘enforced tax compliance’ is caught by the policy tools of 
deterrence,  ρ and φ (monitoring and penalty).
Following Muehlbacher and Kirchler’s (2010) insight, we assume that too frequent tax 
audits and rigorous penalties may corrode the trust of honest taxpayers in tax authorities, but 
at the same time, no audits at all may bring up doubts about power of tax authorities and 
distrust the effectiveness and credibility of tax authorities’ work. Formally, we assume that 
trust in tax authorities (η) is given by:
( )
2 ρφ b ρφ a η × - × =         (5)
with  0 b a, > . In short, trust in tax authorities increases with the power of tax authorities until 
the latter becomes overwhelming. From that point onwards, trust decreases in power (see 
5figure   3).   Therefore,   the   optimal   level   of   policy   tools   is   given   by:  
η max
ρφ
0 ρφ b 2 a 0
ρφ
η










==========  Figs. 3 about here (now at the end)  =========
Furthermore, we assume that trust in tax authorities increases the size of declared 
income, since voluntary compliance is based on a trustful relationship towards tax authorities 
(Muehlbacher and Kirchler, 2010). Hence, let us treat yD as a function of η:
( ) h
D D y y =         (6)
with  0 η / y
D > ¶ ¶   , 
0 y lim
D
0 η > ®  
 and  y y lim
D
max < ®   η η , since there is tax evasion, but it is not 
optimal to evade all of the income. Hence, the value of yD which satisfies the maximization 
condition (2) can be higher or lower according to the share of trust.
If the policy maker sets  * ρφ ρφ = , then trust is maximized; vice versa, if  * ρφ ρφ >  or 
* ρφ ρφ < , then trust is below the optimal level and thus the voluntary compliance is low. In 
particular, if  * ρφ ρφ > , then power decreases voluntary compliance (since it decreases  η), 
while the maximization of trust decreases enforced compliance, since  ρφ  must be reduced. 
Hence, as claimed by the ‘slippery slope’ framework, trust increases and power decreases 
voluntary compliance, while power increases and trust decreases enforced compliance. As a 
result, with the right mix of policy tools of deterrence and trust in tax authorities, a fair and 
profitable interaction between tax authorities and taxpayers could be achieved (Muehlbacher 
and Kirchler, 2010).
Furthermore, if the power of tax authorities which maximizes trust is such that 
( ) ( ) ( ) 0 > + + + e c' e m' φ ρ τ - , then an increase in tax evasion decreases labour market tightness 
and increases unemployment. Hence, this interesting result could even be used by proponents 
of intensified controls and punishment. Indeed, Braithwaite (2003) argues for responsive 
regulation, i.e. to support honest taxpayers but to prosecute persistent tax evaders with the full 
rigor of the law.
64. Conclusions
Recently, attempts have been made to formalize the assumptions of the ‘slippery slope’ 
framework about the effects of trust (in) and power (of) tax authorities on tax compliance. In 
this sense, the present paper introduces the basic insights of the ‘slippery slope’ framework 
into the benchmark macroeconomic model of the labour market with income tax evasion. The 
key result of this integration is the following: with the right mix of policy tools of deterrence 
and trust in tax authorities, a reduction in tax evasion may increase labour market tightness 
and decrease unemployment.
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Figure 3. Tax compliance and Power of tax authorities



























Figure 3. Tax compliance and Trust in tax authorities
9Figure 3. The “slippery slope” of Trust and Power
10Table 1. Data Appendix
European countries Rule of Law 
*  Shadow Economy 
¨ Government Effectiveness *
Austria 99 9.8 93.8
Belgium 89 22.5 90.5
Bulgaria 51.2 38.5 59
Cyprus 84.2 29.4 88.6
Czech Republic 77 19.8 79
Denmark 99.5 18.2 99.5
Estonia 84.7 40.3 84.8
Finland 97.6 18.5 99
France 90 15.4 90
Germany 93.3 16.1 91.9
Greece 73.2 29.9 68.6
Hungary 76.1 25.8 73.8
Ireland 94.3 16 88.1
Italy 62.2 27.2 68.6
Latvia 71.3 41.7 69.5
Lithuania 67.5 31.9 73.3
Luxembourg 96.2 9.9 96.2
Malta 91.4 27 82.9
Netherlands 94.7 13 94.3
Norway 100 19.5 94.8
Poland 65.1 28 71
Portugal 83.7 22.5 85.2
Romania 53.6 36.3 51
Slovakia 67 19.7 76.7
Slovenia 82.3 28 84.3
Spain 85.2 22.9 77.6
Sweden 98.1 19.6 98.6
Turkey 55.5 32.9 63.8
United Kingdom 92.3 12.9 91
**percentile rank (year 2009): from 0 (worst) to 100 (best). Source:
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/mc_countries.asp.
¨¨% of GDP (1996-2007 average). Source: Schneider, Friedrich, Andreas Buehn, and Claudio E. Montenegro, (2010), 
“Shadow Economies All Over the World : New Estimates for 162 Countries from 1999 to 2007”, Policy Research 
Working Paper Series, 5356, The World Bank.
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